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CRIMINAL LAW-CAPITAL PUNISHMENT-AGGRAVATING CIRCUM-
STANCES-CLEAR AND OBJECTIVE STANDARD'-The United States Su-
preme Court held that the Idaho "utter disregard" aggravating cir-
cumstance provided a clear and objective standard for the
sentencer to apply when determining if the death penalty should
be imposed.
Arave v. Creech, 113 S. Ct. 1534 (1993).
On May 13, 1981, a fight occurred in the maximum security unit
of the Idaho State Penitentiary between two inmates, Thomas
Creech ("Creech") and David Jensen ("Jensen").' Creech was serv-
ing life sentences for first degree murders, and Jensen was serving
time for car theft.2 The record states that Jensen approached
Creech and began to attack him with a sock full of batteries. 3
Creech was able to take the weapon away from Jensen; however, a
few minutes later Jensen returned with a toothbrush that had a
razor blade taped to it, and Jensen proceeded to attack Creech
with this weapon.4 Creech retaliated by repeatedly swinging and
striking Jensen in the head with the sock full of batteries until
Jensen collapsed.5 Creech then commenced kicking Jensen in the
head and throat.6 Jensen was subsequently taken to the hospital
where he later died.
7
Creech was charged with murder of the first degree and pled not
guilty.8 Later, however, Creech advised the trial judge by letter
1. State v. Creech, 670 P.2d 463, 465 (Idaho 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1051
(1984). In the maximum security tier, only one inmate is allowed out of his cell at a time for
a period of one hour. State v. Creech, 670 P.2d at 465. However, tier janitors are allowed out
to perform their cleaning duties. Id. Creech was a tier janitor and, thus, was out when Jen-
sen had his hour out for privilege. Id.
2. Arave v. Creech, 113 S. Ct. 1534, 1538 (1993). Before Jensen was incarcerated, he
received a gun shot wound to the head which rendered him mentally and physically handi-
capped. Brief for Petitioner at 7, Arave v. Creech, 113 S. Ct. 1534 (1993) (No. 91-1160). Part
of his brain had been removed, and he had a plastic plate in his skull. Arave v. Creech, 113
S. Ct. at 1538.
3. State v. Creech, 670 P.2d at 465.
4. Id.
5. Id. The' blows with the sock to Jensen's head caused the plate in his head to
shatter, which rendered him helpless. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Creech v. Arave, 928 F.2d 1481, 1484 (9th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 1534 (1993).
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that he desired to change his plea to guilty.9 Over the objection of
defense counsel, the court accepted Creech's guilty plea and sched-
uled a sentencing hearing. 10
At the sentencing hearing, the trial judge reviewed evidence re-
garding both the mitigation and aggravation of the assault." Al-
though the judge determined that Creech was initially justified in
protecting himself, he stated that Creech went beyond self defense
in his retaliation. 2 The trial judge also found that Creech dis-
played utter disregard for human life, and therefore, the court im-
posed the death penalty." On May 23, 1983, the Idaho Supreme
Court affirmed the sentence."'
After the sentence was affirmed, Creech filed a petition for writ
of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Idaho.' 5 The district court denied relief, and Creech ap-
pealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit.' The court of appeals reversed, holding that the utter
9. Creech v. Arave, 928 F.2d at 1484.
10. Id.
11. Id. The Idaho statute requiring the review of mitigating and aggravating circum-
stances is found in § 19-2515(d) of the Idaho Code, which provides:
In all cases in which the death penalty may be imposed, the court shall, after convic-
tion, order a presentence investigation to be conducted according to such procedures
as are prescribed by law and shall thereafter convene a sentencing hearing for the
purpose of hearing all relevant evidence and arguments of counsel in aggravation and
mitigation of the offense. At such hearing, the state and the defendant shall be enti-
tled to present all relevant evidence in aggravation and mitigation. Should any party
present aggravating or mitigating evidence which has not previously been disclosed to
the opposing party or parties, the court shall, upon request, adjourn the hearing until
the party desiring to do so has had a reasonable opportunity to respond to such evi-
dence. Evidence admitted at trail shall be considered and need not be repeated at the
sentencing hearing. Evidence offered at trial but not admitting may be repeated or
amplified if necessary to complete the record.
IDAHO CODE § 19-2515(d) (1987).
12. Arave v. Creech, 113 S. Ct. at 1538-39.
13. Id. at 1539. The "utter disregard" aggravating circumstance as defined by the
Idaho Code is as follows: "The following are statutory aggravating circumstances, at least
one (1) of which must be found to exist beyond a reasonable doubt before a sentence of
death can be imposed: . . .(6) By the murder or circumstance surrounding its commission,
the defendant exhibited utter disregard for human life." IDAHO CODE § 19-2515(g)(6) (1987).
14. State v. Creech, 670 P.2d at 476. The Idaho Supreme Court temporarily re-
manded to the trial judge in order that he comply with § 19-2503 of the Idaho Code, which
provides that a sentence must be imposed in open court and in the defendant's presence.
Creech v. Arave, 928 F.2d at 1489. Section 19-2503 of the Idaho Code states "[flor the pur-
pose of judgment, if the conviction is for a felony, the defendant must be personally present;
if for a misdemeanor, judgment may be pronounced in his absence." IDAHO CODE § 19-2503
(1987).
15. Arave v. Creech, 113 S. Ct. at 1539.
16. Creech v. Arave, 928 F.2d at 1481.
348
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disregard standard that the trial court relied on when imposing the
capital punishment sentence was unconstitutionally vague.17 On
October 16, 1991, both a petition for rehearing and suggestion of
rehearing en banc were denied, and the court reaffirmed its holding
with a few amendments.' 8 On August 12, 1992, the United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari on the limited question of
whether the utter disregard circumstance as interpreted by the
Idaho Supreme Court in State v. Osborn 9 was unconstitutionally,
vague.20 Specifically, the Court determined whether the Idaho
standard provided a clear and objective test to be applied by the
sentencer, and whether the standard adequately limited and chan-
neled the sentencer's discretion as required by the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
2
1
When a federal court determines the issue of whether a state's
aggravating circumstance adequately limits and channels a sen-
tencer's discretion, the court applies a two-step analysis.22 First,
the court determines whether the statutory language itself is too
vague, and if the court finds that it is, the court will look to see if
state courts have defined the language further.23 The United States
Supreme Court stated that since the Idaho Supreme Court
adopted a limiting construction, it was unnecessary to decide
whether the statutory phrase "utter disregard for human life"'1 it-
self was constitutional.2" Therefore, the Court focused on how the
17. Id. at 1492.
18. Creech v. Arave, 947 F.2d 873, 875 (9th Cir. 1991). Judge Trott filed a dissenting
opinion in which he stated that a rehearing of the case en banc should be granted. Id. Judge
Trott stated that the "utter disregard" standard as narrowed by the Idaho Supreme Court
in State v. Osborn, 631 P.2d 187 (Idaho 1981), was not unconstitutionally vague. Id. at 892
(Trott, J., dissenting).
19. 631 P.2d 187 (Idaho 1981). The court held that the phrase "utter disregard" "is
meant to be reflective of acts or circumstances surrounding the crime which exhibit the
highest, the utmost callous disregard for human life, i.e., the cold-blooded, pitiless slayer."
Osborn, 631 P.2d at 201.
20. Arave v. Creech, 113 S. Ct. 5 (1992).
21. Arave v. Creech, 113 S. Ct. at 1538. The Eighth Amendment to the Constitution of
the United States provides in pertinent part: "[Nior [shall] cruel and unusual punishments
[be] inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. The pertinent part of the Fourteenth Amendment
provides: "[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
22. Arave v. Creech, 113 S. Ct. at 1541 (relying on Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639,
654 (1990)). See notes 78-85 and accompanying text.
23. Arave v. Creech, 113 S. Ct. 1541 (relying on Walton, 497 U.S. at 654). See notes
78-85.
24. IDAHO CODE § 19-2515(g)(6) (1987). See note 13.
25. Arave v. Creech, 113 S. Ct. at 1541.
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Idaho Supreme Court defined the utter disregard standard 2 6The Idaho Supreme Court defined "utter disregard" in State v.
Osborn."' The United States Supreme Court stated that the terms
"cold-blooded" and "pitiless" as set forth in Osborn described the
"defendant's state of mind, not his mens rea, but his attitude to-
ward his conduct and his victim."28 Thus, the Supreme Court
noted that one could determine another's state of mind by sur-
rounding circumstances, and therefore, the "utter disregard" stan-
dard was held to be objective, not subjective.29
Moreover, the Court analyzed whether the Idaho limiting con-
struction narrowed the class of persons eligible to receive the death
penalty.30 The Supreme Court contended that the word "pitiless"
alone would not be adequate to narrow the class because it is hard
to imagine a person with compassion murdering another without
justification.3 1 However, the Court also stated that the term "piti-
less" used in conjunction with "cold-blooded" would adequately
narrow the class because not all first degree murderers are "cold-
blooded."32 The United States Supreme Court declared that first
degree murderers who kill because of anger, revenge, jealousy, and
various other emotions would not be subject to the death penalty
under the Idaho standard.3
The Court rejected the argument made by Creech that the con-
stitutionality of the utter disregard standard should be determined
by reviewing Idaho cases to see if the limiting construction of Os-
born had been applied consistently.34 The Court announced that
the question of whether state courts have consistently applied ag-
gravating circumstances was different and separate from the ques-
tion of whether the circumstance was constitutional.3 5 Thus,
whether state courts have consistently applied an aggravating cir-
cumstance was irrelevant to the issue of whether the limitation was
26. Id.
27. 631 P. 2d 187 (Idaho 1981). See note 19.
28. Arave v. Creech, 113 S. Ct. at 1541.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 1542.
31. Id. at 1543.
32. Id. The United States Supreme Court held that the term "cold-blooded" meant
emotionless or "one marked by absence of warm feelings: Without consideration, compunc-
tion, or clemency." Id. at 1541 (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY
1726 (1986)).
33. Arave v. Creech, 113 S. Ct. at 1543.
34. Id. at 1544.




Moreover, the United States Supreme Court held that the utter
disregard circumstance as defined by the Idaho Supreme Court in
Osborn adequately limited and channeled a sentencer's discre-
tion. 7 Therefore, it met the constitutional requirements of the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. 8
Justice Blackmun filed a dissenting opinion, and was joined
therein by Justice Stevens.39 Justice Blackmun argued that the
limiting construction given in Osborn, specifically the "cold-
blooded, pitiless slayer" qualification, did not adequately narrow
the class of persons subject to capital punishment.40 He stated that
the Idaho Supreme Court's interpretation of the "utter disregard"
standard in Osborn could cover any and every intentional or first
degree murder.4 1 Therefore, the dissent said that the formulation
would be unconstitutional.42
Furthermore, Justice Blackmun maintained that the Court was
incorrect when it declined to review past Idaho court cases to see if
the limiting construction of Osborn was applied consistently.' s The
dissent argued that the fact that Idaho courts have not applied the
limitation consistently was relevant to the determination of
whether the limitation was constitutional." Thus, Justice Black-
mun concluded that the holding of the Court was incorrect, and
that it should have found the utter disregard circumstance
unconstitutional.4
5
The United States Supreme Court first addressed the issue of
arbitrary and inconsistent impositions of the death penalty in
1972. In Furman v. Georgia," the Supreme Court examined three
36. Id.
37. Id. at 1544.
38. Arave v. Creech, 113 S. Ct. at 1544.
39. Id. at 1545 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
40. Id. at 1546. The dissent stated that "cold-blooded" should be defined by everyday.
meaning or by legal usage. Id. at 1547. People routinely use the term "cold-blooded" to refer
to anyone who kills. Id. Moreover, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY defines "cold-blooded" as fol-
lows: "to designate a willful, deliberate, and premeditated homicide." BLACK'S LAW DICTION-
ARY 260 (6th ed. 1990).
41. Arave v. Creech, 113 S. Ct. at 1548 (Blackmun, J. dissenting).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 1548-49.
44. Id. Justice Blackmun stated "[t]he majority misses the point. Idaho's application
of the Osborn formulation is relevant not because that formulation has been inconsistently
invoked, but because the construction has never meant what the majority says it does." Id.
at 1548.
45. Id. at 1550.
46. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). All five Justices who joined in the majority opinion wrote
1994
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different situations in which the death penalty was imposed."7 The
Supreme Court noted that in each of these cases the trier of fact in
his or her sole discretion determined whether or not the death pen-
alty should be imposed.48 The Court held that this was a violation
of the Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual pun-
ishment and the Fourteenth Amendment right to life since it led to
arbitrary and inconsistent impositions of capital punishment.4
Thus, in order to avoid violating the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments, the Court concluded that a state must adequately
limit and channel a sentencer's discretion by its penal code and
establish an objective standard to be applied to all capital defend-
ants in the same manner.5
After the Court handed down its decision in Furman, the indi-
vidual states began to adopt penal codes which established specific
aggravating factors to assist and guide the discretion of the sen-
tencer when determining whether the death penalty should be im-
posed. 1 The Supreme Court began examining a series of cases in-
volving the constitutionality of aggravating circumstances in 1976.
The first case examined by the Court was Gregg v. Georgia.51 In
Gregg, the defendant was charged with, and found guilty of, the
armed robbery and murder of two men.s At the sentencing hear-
ing, the judge instructed the jury that the only way it would be
authorized to impose the death penalty was if it found beyond a
reasonable doubt that the murder occurred during the commission
of another felony, or if the murder was committed for monetary
gain, or if the murder "was outrageously and wantonly vile, horri-
ble and inhuman.
'54
separate concurring opinions. Id. at 240.
47. Furman, 408 U.S. at 252.
48. Id. at 256 (Douglas, J., concurring).
49. Id. Justices Brennan and Marshall found that the death penalty itself violated the
Eighth Amendment. Id. at 305 (Brennan, J., concurring), 370-71 (Marshall, J., concurring).
50. Id. at 256 (Douglas, J., concurring).
51. Troy R. Olsen, Comment, Utter Disregard for Human Life - A Clear and Objec-
tive Standard for the Purpose of Imposing the Death Penalty?, 28 IDAHo L. REV. 421, 428
(1992).
52. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
53. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 157. Defendant and a companion were hitchhiking north in
Florida when they were picked up by a motorist. Id. at 158. Later, at a rest stop in Georgia,
the defendant robbed, shot and killed the motorist and his passenger. Id. at 159.
54. Id. at 161. The judge specifically stated that the death penalty could only be im-
posed if the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt one of the following aggravating
circumstances:
'One'-That the offense of murder was committed while the offender was engaged in
the commission of two other capital felonies, to-wit the armed robbery of [Simmons
352 Vol. 32:347
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The jury found that the first two circumstances of the judge's
instruction applied to the matter and thus returned the verdict of
death.5 The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the convictions
and the imposition of the death penalty for murder.56 The peti-
tioner appealed, and the United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari, which was limited to the question of whether the Geor-
gia statutory system, which allowed the imposition of the death
penalty if at least one aggravating circumstance was found in a
murder trial, violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments as
cruel and unusual punishment.5 7 The Court held that the Georgia
sentencing scheme adequately channelled the sentencer's discre-
tion so as to avoid inconsistent or arbitrary impositions of the
death penalty.58
The next case the Court examined regarding aggravating circum-
stances was Proffitt v. Florida.9 In deciding this case, the Court
reviewed the Florida sentencing statute.6 0 The defendant chal-
and Moore].
'Two'-That the offender committed the offense of murder for the purpose of receiv-
ing money and the automobile described in the indictment.
'Three'-The offense of murder was outrageously and wantonly vile, horrible and in-
human, in that they [sic] involved the depravity of [the] mind of the Defendant.
Id.
55. Id.
56. Gregg v. Georgia, 210 S.E.2d 659 (Ga. 1974), aff'd, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
57. Gregg v. Georgia, 423 U.S. 1082 (1976). Section 17-10-30 (b)(7) of Georgia's sen-
tencing code provides:
In all cases of other offenses for which the death penalty may be authorized, the
judge shall consider, or he shall include in his instructions to the jury for it to con-
sider, any mitigating circumstances or aggravating circumstances otherwise author-
ized by law and any of the following statutory aggravating circumstances which may
be supported by the evidence:
(7) The offense of murder, rape, armed robbery, or kidnapping was outrageously or
wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind, or
an aggravated battery to the victim.
GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-30 (b)(7) (Michie 1990).
58. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 206-07. The Court stated "[w]hile the jury is permitted to con-
sider any aggravating or mitigating circumstances it must find and identify at least one
statutory aggravating factor before it may impose a penalty of death." Id. at 206.
59. 428 U.S. 242 (1976). The defendant in this case was charged, convicted, and sen-
tenced to death for murder. Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 245. The Supreme Court of Florida af-
firmed the conviction and the United Sates Supreme Court granted certiorari limited to the
question of whether the Florida statute which allowed the imposition of the death penalty
for those convicted of first degree murder adequately channelled and limited the sentencer's
discretion. Id. at 247.
60. Id. at 251. The Florida sentencing statute required the trial judge to weigh eight
aggravating factors and seven mitigating factors when deciding whether to impose the death
sentence, and it provided for the automatic review by the Florida Supreme Court when a
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lenged that the statute was vague, particularly the eighth and third
statutory aggravating circumstances "which authorize the death
penalty to be imposed if the crime is especially 'heinous, atrocious,
or cruel', or if the defendant knowingly created a great risk of
death to many persons."61 The Court examined the manner in
which the Florida Supreme Court had construed and applied these
circumstances, and found the Florida court had further defined
these provisions by definition and in application to case law.
6 2
Therefore, the Court held that the circumstances as construed and
narrowed by the Florida Supreme Court were not unconstitution-
ally vague. 3
In 1980, the Court was asked in Godfrey v. Georgia" to examine
the Georgia aggravating circumstance which allowed for the impo-
sition of the death penalty if a murder "was outrageously or wan-
tonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, deprav-
ity of mind, or an aggravated battery to the victim."6 The
defendant in Godfrey shot and killed his estranged wife and his
mother-in-law." He was tried and found guilty on two counts of
murder and one count of aggravated assault and was sentenced to
sentence of death had been imposed. Id. Chapter 921.141 (3) and (4) of the Florida sentenc-
ing statute provide:
(3) FINDINGS IN SUPPORT OF SENTENCE OF DEATH.-Notwithstanding the
recommendation of a majority of the jury, the court, after weighing the aggravating
and mitigating circumstances, shall enter a sentence of life imprisonment or death
(4) REVIEW OF JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE.-The judgment of conviction and
sentence of death shall be subject to automatic review by the Supreme Court of Flor-
ida within 60 days after certification by the sentencing court of the entire record,
unless the time is extended for an additional period not to exceed 30 days by the
Supreme Court for good cause shown. Such review by the Supreme Court shall have
priority over all other cases and shall be heard in accordance with rules promulgated
by the Supreme Court.
FLA. STAT. ch. 921.141 (3) and (4) (1985).
61. Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 255 (citing FLA. STAT. ch. 921.141 (5)(h),(c) (Supp. 1993)).
62. Id. at 256.
63. Id. at 258.
64. 446 U.S. 420 (1980).
65. Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 428-29.
66. Id. at 425. In Godfrey, the defendant and his wife were in the process of obtaining
a legal separation and the wife had charged defendant with aggravated assault. Id. at 424.
The defendant wanted to reconcile with his wife, but she refused to reconcile. Id. at 425.
When his wife refused to reconcile, he went to his mother-in-law's trailer where his wife and
daughter were staying and he shot his wife through the window; she died instantly. Id. He
then entered the trailer and struck his eleven-year old daughter with the barrel of the gun
and shot and killed instantly his mother-in-law. Id. He then called the police and turned
himself in for the double murder. Id.
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death. 7 The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the conviction. 8
In previous cases, the Georgia Supreme Court had required that
the state prove serious physical abuse or torture before the death
penalty would be imposed for the aggravating circumstance char-
acterized as "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhu-
man." 9 The United States Supreme Court noted in Godfrey that
there was no infliction of pain and both of the victims died in-
stantly, so therefore the "outrageous" standard as defined by the
Georgia Supreme Court could not apply.70 Furthermore, the Court
held that the "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman"
standard, standing alone, without further definition from the Geor-
gia Supreme Court, did not adequately channel the sentencer's dis-
cretion because this standard could depict any and every murder.
71
Therefore, since the narrowing limitation of abuse, as had previ-
ously been required by the Georgia Supreme Court, was not found,
the Court reversed and remanded the case for further
proceedings.
72
Subsequently, the Court in Zant v. Stephens7 3 and Maynard v.
67. Id. at 426.
68. Godfrey v. Georgia, 253 S.E.2d 710 (Ga. 1979), rev'd in part, 446 U.S. 420 (1980).
69. See for example, McCorquodale v. State, 211 S.E.2d 577 (Ga. 1974), cert. denied,
428 U.S. 910 (1976) (upholding the death penalty for a murder which involved the rape,
abuse, and burning of the victim before the murder); Blake v. State, 236 S.E.2d 637 (Ga.
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 960 (1977) (upholding the imposition of the death penalty for
the murder of a two-year old child by her father, stating that the murder was "outrageously
or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman that it involved torture, depravity of mind, or an
aggravated battery to the victim" Id. at 641.); and Harris v. State, 230 S.E.2d 1 (Ga. 1976),
cert. denied, 431 U.S. 933 (1977) (upholding the death penalty for a murder in which the
defendant forced the victim to beg for her life and then proceeded to shoot and kill the
victim while the defendant laughed).
70. Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 433.
71. Id. at 428-29.
72. Id. at 433.
73. 462 U.S. 862 (1983). In the Zant case, the defendant, an escaped convict, was
charged, found guilty, and sentenced to death for murder. Id. at 864. The jury imposed the
sentence of death after finding two aggravating circumstances existed. Id. The two aggravat-
ing circumstances the jury found to apply were as follows:
(1) The offense of murder, rape, armed robbery, or kidnapping was committed by a
person with a prior record of conviction for a capital felony, or the offense of murder
was committed by a person who has substantial history of serious assaultive criminal
convictions.
(9) The offense of murder was committed by a person in, or who has escaped from,
the lawful custody of a peace officer or place of lawful confinement.
GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-30 (b)(1) and (b)(9) (Michie 1990).
After the defendant's conviction and sentence were imposed, the Georgia Supreme Court
stated the second clause of GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-30 (b)(1) - "a substantial history of seri-
ous assaultive criminal convictions" was unconstitutionally vague. Zant, 462 U.S. at 867 (ci-
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Cartwright"' reiterated the holding that, in order for an aggravat-
ing circumstance to be valid, it must genuinely narrow the class of
persons eligible for the death penalty and must adequately channel
a sentencer's discretion. Moreover, the cases stressed that an ag-
gravating circumstance will be held invalid if it is applied in an
arbitrary and inconsistent manner.
In Maynard, the Supreme Court reviewed the Oklahoma aggra-
vating circumstance which imposed the death penalty if the mur-
der was "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel. ' 76 The Court held
that the "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel" circumstance of
Oklahoma gave no more guidance to the sentencer than the Geor-
gia standard of "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhu-
man" which the Court held unconstitutionally vague in Godfrey.77
In 1990, the United States Supreme Court, in Walton v. Ari-
zona78 and Lewis v. Jeffers79 addressed the constitutionality of the
tations omitted). The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the conviction since the other aggra-
vating circumstance was valid but the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
reversed. Id. at 868. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and held that
since the jury found two aggravating circumstances and since "no suggestion [was] made
that the presence of more than one aggravating circumstance should be given special
weight," the subsequent invalidity of one should not effect the sentence since the jury must
only find one aggravating circumstance to apply in order to impose the death penalty. Id. at
891.
74. 486 U.S. 356 (1988). In Maynard, the defendant, a disgruntled ex-employee, en-
tered the home of his former employer and shot and killed his former employer. Maynard,
486 U.S. at 358. The defendant also shot his former employer's wife twice in the leg and
stabbed her; however, she survived the attack. Id. The defendant was charged and found
guilty of first degree murder and sentenced to death. Id. at 358-59.
75. Maynard, 486 U.S. at 362. See also, McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987)
(holding that a state must adopt criteria which distinguishes situations in which capital
punishment can be imposed and those that it cannot); California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538,
541 (1987) (stating that one of the prerequisites to a valid death penalty is that the sen-
tencer not be given unbridled discretion); Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 460 (1984)
(holding that "[i]f a state has determined that death should be an available penalty for
certain crimes, then it must administer that penalty in a way that can rationally distinguish
between those individuals for whom death is an appropriate sanction and those for whom it
is not").
76. Maynard, 486 U.S. at 359.
77. Id. at 364.
78. 497 U.S. 639 (1990). The defendant in this case was convicted and sentenced to
death for murder. Walton, 497 U.S. at 644. The defendant in Walton and two other accom-
plices robbed the victim at gunpoint, forced him into the car and drove him into the desert
where the defendant later shot the victim in the head and left him to die. Id. The medical
examiner determined that the gun shot did not kill the victim, but blinded him and he later
died from dehydration, starvation and pneumonia. Id. at 644-45.
79. 497 U.S. 764 (1990). In Lewis, the defendant injected an overdose of heroin into
the victim which rendered her unconscious, strangled her until no pulse was found, and at
that point proceeded to strike the victim and call her abusive names. Lewis, 497 U.S. at 766-
356
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Arizona "especially heinous, cruel or depraved" aggravating cir-
cumstance.8 0 In Walton, the Court announced the standard two-
step procedure a federal court must undertake when reviewing the
constitutionality of a state's aggravating circumstance."' Under this
test, the federal court must first determine whether the statutory
language is too vague to guide the sentencer's discretion.2 If the
court finds the language too ambiguous, it must next determine if
the state courts have further defined the vague terms as to provide
a clear standard to be applied. 3
The Supreme Court found that the Arizona "especially heinous,
cruel or depraved" circumstance was vague, but that the Arizona
Supreme Court had further defined the circumstance to mean any
crime which inflicted mental or physical abuse to the victim before
death, or one in which the murderer takes pleasure or relishes.84
The Court held that the further definition by the Arizona Supreme
Court provided an adequate guidance for the sentencer, and thus,
held it to be constitutional.8 5
The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that the
death penalty in and of itself is not cruel and unusual punishment
67. The defendant was charged, convicted, and sentenced to death for murder. Id. at 771.
80. The pertinent parts of the Arizona statute are § 13-703(E) and § 13-703(F)(6).
Section 13-703(E) provides:
In determining whether to impose a sentence of death or life imprisonment, ... the
court shall take into account the aggravating and mitigating circumstances included
in subsections F and G of this section and shall impose a sentence of death if the
court finds one or more of the aggravating circumstances enumerated in Subsection F
of this section and that there are no mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial
to call for leniency.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(E) (Supp. 1993).
Section 13-703(F)(6) provides "[aiggravating circumstances to be considered shall be the
following: . . . The defendant committed the offense in an especially heinous, cruel or de-
praved manner." ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 703(F)(6) (Supp. 1993).
81. Walton, 497 U.S. at 654.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 654-55.
85. Id. at 655. See also, Lewis, 497 U.S. at 777 (quoting Walton, 497 U.S. at 655), in
which the Court stated, "[r]ecognizing that the proper degree of definition of an aggravating
factor of this nature is not susceptible of mathematical precision, we conclude that the defi-
nition given to the 'especially cruel' provision by the Arizona Supreme Court is constitution-
ally sufficient because it gives meaningful guidance to the sentencer." Id. Also, in Lewis, the
Court was faced with the issue of whether a federal court may make a de novo review of
state cases to determine if the narrowing definition of an aggravating circumstance has been
applied consistently. Lewis, 497 U.S. at 780. The Court held that a federal court should not
engage in such activity except if a state court's application of an aggravating circumstance is
such that no 'reasonable sentencer' could find that the circumstances exist. See Arave v.
Creech, 113 S. Ct. at 1544.
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as long as it is not inflicted in an arbitrary or inconsistent man-
ner.8 The Court in Arave v. Creech clearly reinforced the principle
that it set out in its prior decisions.8 7 This established principle
stipulates that, in order for an aggravating circumstance to be con-
stitutional, the circumstance must adequately limit and channel
the sentencer's discretion when determining whether to apply the
death penalty, and it must distinguish the class of persons eligible
to receive the death penalty from those who are not.
Although the Court correctly enunciated the basic principles of
previous case law in Arave v. Creech, the Court incorrectly found
that those principles exist in the Idaho "utter disregard" aggravat-
ing circumstance. The majority held that the definition expounded
by the Idaho Supreme Court in Osborn8 sufficiently narrowed and
channelled the sentencer's discretion. However, the Court merely
substituted one admittedly vague and broad phrase ("utter disre-
gard for human life") with another ("the utmost callous disregard
for human life, i.e., the cold-blooded, pitiless slayer").8 9
In Furman v. Georgia,90 the Court stated that any statute which
left the decision of whether the death penalty should be imposed
up to the sole discretion of the trier of fact was unconstitutional."
The Court called for legislatures to write penal codes which were
"even-handed, nonselective, and nonarbitrary, and to require
judges to see to it that general laws are not applied sparsely, selec-
tively, and spottily to unpopular groups.''92
Obviously, the Court in Arave v. Creech did not follow this ra-
tionale. The phrase "utmost callous disregard for human life, i.e.,
the cold-blooded, pitiless slayer" is a subjective phrase which may
mean different things to different triers of fact depending upon the
moral character and makeup of the sentencer. Since the Idaho Su-
preme Court never fully defined what it meant by "cold-blooded,
pitiless slayer," the sentencer was left with unbridled discretion.
86. See for example, Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). See notes 46 - 50 and
accompanying text; Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). See notes 52 - 58 and accompany-
ing text; Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980). See notes 64-72 and accompanying text.
87. See for example, Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). See notes 46 - 50 and
accompanying text; Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). See notes 52 - 58 and accompany-
ing text; Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980). See notes 64 - 72 and accompanying text;
Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356 (1988). See notes 74 - 77 and accompanying text; Wal-
ton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990). See notes 78 - 85 and accompanying text.
88. See note 19.
89. Olsen, cited at note 51, at 440.
90. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). See notes 46-50 and accompanying text.
91. Furman, 408 U.S. at 256 (Douglas, J., concurring).
92. Id.
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One trier of fact may consider a planned murder which was carried
out in a very calm and calculated manner to be cold-blooded and
pitiless, whereas another trier of fact may not find a murder to be
cold-blooded unless the murder involved some violent act or period
of extended torture or pain. 3
Thus, under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, the Idaho
aggravating circumstance phrase does not provide a clear and ob-
jective standard for the sentencer to apply, nor does it provide a
meaningful basis of the classification of which murderers would
and which would not be subject to the death penalty. Therefore,
when the United States Supreme Court announced its holding that
the "utter disregard" aggravating circumstance was constitutional,
the Court took a step backwards and reinstated the very arbitrari-
ness in imposing capital punishment that it sought to avoid in
Furman v. Georgia.4
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93. See State v. Aragon, 690 P.2d 293, 302 (Idaho 1984) (holding that the "utter disre-
gard" aggravating circumstance applied when the defendant drowned a defenseless eight-
month old girl in the bathtub, was only concerned with covering up his participation, and
refused to request medical aid). Compare State v. Creech, 670 P.2d 463 (Idaho 1983) (hold-
ing that the "utter disregard" circumstance applied when Creech retaliated to a provoked
attacked, called for emergency assistance for the victim, and confessed to the crime).
94. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). See notes 46 - 50 and accompanying text. Cf. Richard A. Ro-
sen, The "'Especially Heinous" Aggravating Circumstance in Capital Cases-The Standar-
dless Standard, 64 N.C. L. REV. 941 (1986). In this article, Rosen explores the "especially
heinous, atrocious, or cruel" aggravating circumstance applied by 24 states when determin-
ing whether the death penalty should be imposed. Id. at 943. Rosen stated that when the
legislatures enacted this circumstance they placed a burden on the sentencer to try to deter-
mine with little or no guidance when the death penalty should be imposed. Id. at 992. He
further stated that "[b]ecause of their inability to bear this burden, the courts have allowed
the evils identified in Furman v. Georgia and condemned by the due process vagueness doc-
trine to reenter the capital punishment system." Id.

